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Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson I is a case well worth the attention of all
students of the legal process. The case, involving the intersection of two im-
portant federal labor statutes, is likely to commend itself to the close atten-
tion of the labor law specialist.2 Predictably, however, it will put off the casual
reader, and perhaps trouble, but never fully engage, those persons who are
more professionally committed to exploring the pages of the United States
Reports. This comment has no more ambitious aim than to rescue Sinclair
from so humble a destiny.
A collective bargaining contract between Sinclair and The Oil Workers
Union included a provision requiring arbitration of employee grievances over
wages, hours, or conditions of employment and a provision prohibiting strikes
or work stoppages over grievances subject to arbitration. Alleging that the
union had repeatedly violated the no-strike pledge, Sinclair asked a federal
district court for an injunction. Jurisdiction over the suit was based upon
Section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organi-
zation .... may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in con-
troversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.3
One might suppose that the district court would have the power to fashion
a remedy appropriate to any case properly brought under section 301, at least
if the remedy were one traditionally available in the district courts of the
United States. And one might also suppose that if Sinclair could prove its
case, an injunction against the strike activity would be the appropriate rem-
edy. These suppositions, however, overlook the Norris-LaGuardia Act, an
tProfessor of Law, Yale University.
.Editor-in-chief, 72 Yale Law Journal, 1962-63.
1. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
2. For pre-Sinclair commentary on the substantive issue of labor law posed in the
case, see Stewart, No-Strike Clauses in the Federal Courts, 59 Mfxcn. L. Rzv. 673, 631-
85 (1961); Cox, Current Problems it; the Law of Grie'ance Arbitration, 30 RocKY MTr.
L. REv. 247, 252-56 (1958) ; Comment, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Labor Laow:
The Contemporary Role of Norris-LaGuardia, 70 YALE L.J. 70, 95-100 (1960). For post-
Sinclair commentary, see Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 247 (1962).
3. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
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earlier handiwork of Congress that the Oil Workers Union was pleased to
call to the attention of the court. Section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia provides:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any re-
straining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case in-
volving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or
persons participating or interested in such dispute ... from doing, whether
singly or in concert, any of the following acts: (a) Ceasing or refusing
to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment. .... 4
The statute broadly defines a labor dispute as "any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or repre-
sentation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking
to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not
the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."
Juxtaposing Norris-LaGuardia and section 301 and looking to language
alone, it now might appear that an injunction is the one remedy the district
court could not grant. The Norris-LaGuardia Act's definition of a labor dis-
pute comfortably includes the controversy between Sinclair and the Oil Work-
ers Union, and section 4 of that statute is an outright denial of jurisdiction to
issue an injunction against a peaceful strike.
Supporting this conclusion from the plain meaning of Norris-LaGuardia is
the legislative history of section 301, which makes it inescapably clear that
Congress did not intend to repeal Norris-LaGuardia in providing for juris-
diction in the district courts over suits for breach of a collective bargaining
contract. The history is well recounted in the opinion for the Court by Mr.
Justice Black:
When the inquiry is carried beyond the language of section 301 into its
legislative history, whatever small doubts as to the congressional purpose
could have survived consideration of the bare language of the section
should be wholly dissipated. For the legislative history of section 301
shows that Congress actually considered the advisability of repealing the
Norris-LaGuardia Act insofar as suits based upon breach of collective
bargaining agreements are concerned and deliberately chose not to do so.
The section as eventually enacted was the product of a conference between
Committees of the House and Senate, selected to resolve the differences
between conflicting provisions of the respective bills each had passed.
Prior to this conference, the House bill had provided for federal juris-
diction of suits for breach of collective bargaining contracts and had ex-
pressly declared that the Norris-LaGuardia Act's anti-injunction pro-
visions would not apply to such suits. The bill passed by the Senate, like
the House bill, granted federal courts jurisdiction over suits for breach
of such agreements but it did not, like the House bill, make the Norris-
LaGuardia Act's prohibition against injunctions inapplicable to such suits.
Instead it made breach of a collective agreement an unfair labor practice.
Under the Senate version, therefore, a breach of a collective bargaining
agreement, like any unfair labor practice, could have been enjoined by a
4. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
5. 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1958).
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suit brought by the National Labor Relations Board, but no provision of
the Senate version would have permitted the issuance of an injunction in
a labor dispute at the suit of a private party. At the conference the pro-
vision of the House bill expressly repealing the anti-injunction provisions
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, as well as the provision of the bill passed
by the Senate declaring the breach of a collective agreement to be an
unfair labor practice, was dropped and never became law. Instead, the
conferees, as indicated by the provision which came out of the conference
and eventually became section 301, agreed that suits for breach of such
agreements should remain wholly private and "be left to the usual proc-
esses of the law" and that, in view of the fact that these suits would be
at the instance of private parties rather than at the instance of the Labor
Board, no change in the existing anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act should be made. The House Conference Report expressly
recognized that the House provision for repeal in contract actions of the
anti-injunction prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act had been elim-
inated in Conference .... 1
Plain meaning and legislative history were enough for the district court, the
court of appeals, and a majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court. They
all agreed that the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes a federal district court
from enjoining a peaceful strike in breach of a no-strike pledge, even if the
strike is over an arbitrable grievance.
Plain'meaning and legislative history, however, were not enough for three
members of the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Douglas and Harlan, reasoned that the provisions of Norris-LaGuardia and
section 301 were, as applied to the Sinclair dispute, in conflict and that the
Court in such a situation had an obligation to harmonize such legislation even
if Congress did not. This was to be accomplished by reconciling the two stat-
utes in a manner that would best effectuate the central purposes of each.
These principles of statutory interpretation are highly significant and funda-
mentally sound, and in most cases are fully adequate to resolve conflicts be-
tween statutes. But Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson is not like most cases,
and to our mind these principles fall short of resolving the problem in that
case.
In order to examine adequately the method of statutory interpretation em-
ployed in the Sinclair dissent and to suggest why it fails, it may be profitable
to venture at this point some rather general observations about some ordinary
principles of statutory interpretation.
1. The Plain Meaning Ride
The plain meaning or literal interpretation of statutes, while adding what
is often an illusion of certainty to judging, can result in decisions that lack
any conscious, substantive policy content. When a judge relies upon the plain
6. 370 U.S. 195, 205-07 (1962). (Footnotes omitted.)
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meaning of a statute, he may do so because he believes that the plain meaning
is the best evidence of legislative purpose available to him. In any particular
case, however, this assumption may be fallacious, the fallacy stemming perhaps
from an innocent notion that words can have a single meaning,7 but more like-
ly from a misunderstanding of how legislatures must work.8 The case before
the court may very well involve questions unforeseen or unforeseeable by the
legislature. In such a situation, is it not unrealistic to assume that the legis-
lature decided these questions and embodied its decision in the language of
its enactment? If, under these circumstances, a court decides a case because
of a statute's plain meaning, its decision will be one that rests upon abstract
doctrine of statutory interpretation that bears no necessary relationship to
legislative purpose. Reliance on a plain meaning rule, therefore, may result
in a decision where neither court nor legislature grapples with the substan-
tive problem at issue.
2. The Rule of Legislative Purpose
Judicial legislation is a necessary condition of the legal system because
legislatures deal with problems prospectively, cannot foresee all they deal with,
and cannot resolve all they do foresee. Most students of the legal process,
however, would probably agree that courts -have an obligation in construing
7. One need not work through Ogden and Richard's numerous meanings of meaning
to appreciate the ambiguities inherent in language. Litigation turning on a disputed in-
terpretation of a statute would be a rare occurrence if statutes had a "plain meaning"
upon which most men would agree. Indeed such litigation usually does not begin unless
the "plain meaning" is susceptible of more than one interpretation.
"There is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally ..
Of course one begins with the words of a statute to ascertain its meaning, but one
does not end with them. The notion, that the plain meaning of the words of a statute
defines the meaning of the statute reminds one of T. H. Huxley's gay observation
that at times "a theory survives long after its brains are knocked out."
Massachusetts Bonding Co. v. United States, 352 U.S. 128, 138 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
See generally Chafee, The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COLUm. L. REv. 381
(1941).
8. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLuM. L. av.
527, 528 (1947).
A statute is an instrument of government partaking of its practical purposes but
also of its infirmities and limitations, of its awkward and groping efforts. With one
of his flashes of insight, Mr. Justice Johnson called the science of government
"the science of experiment."
For an amusing example of the limits on human prescience without the complicating
factors involved ir the legislative process, see Professor Chafee's story of Hugh and
Patricia. Upon their divorce, Hugh simply provided in an irrevocable trust that his wife
was to receive the income from an' estate until her death or until she remarried. Patricia
remarried her former husband Hugh, which phenomenon, while bringing bliss to Hugh
and Patricia, caused the trustee considerable difficulty in deciding whether the life estate
was terminated. Chafee, supra note 7, at 381-82.
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statutes to make law that effectuates legislative purpose. Judge Learned Hand
has well expressed this view and the difficulties and hazards of the undertak-
ing:
When we ask what Congress "intended," usually there can be no answer,
if what we mean is what any person or group of persons actually had in
mind. Flinch as we may, what we do, and must do, is to project our-
selves, as best we can, into the position of those who uttered the words,
and to impute to them how they would have dealt with the concrete
occasion. He who supposes that he can be certain of the result is the least
fitted for the attempt.9
Where the legislative purpose is extremely vague or the delegation of law-
making power to the courts broad, the duty of a court to effectuate legislative
purpose becomes identical with a general obligation of the courts to formulate
a consistent and coherent body of law.10
3. The Problem of "Interlacing Statutes"
Reliance on the plain meaning rule seems especially misplaced where two or
more statutes, passed at different times and often the product of different
political forces, bear upon an issue before the court. To assume that accom-
modation or reconciliation of apparently conflicting statutes is work only for
the legislature is to ignore the dynamics of the legislative process. The prob-
lem, as it comes to the court, may have been unforeseeable at the time of
legislative deliberation. It may have been overlooked. It may have been thought
too unimportant to occupy the time of very busy men. Judicial accommoda-
tion can be accomplished only by ascertaining the purpose of each statute
through an examination of the language, history and judicial gloss that has
been placed upon each."
9. United States v. Klinger, 199 F2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1952), off'd by an equally
divided Court, 345 U.S. 979 (1953).
10. There will and must remain that group of cases-smaller than is generally sup-
posed-where no meaning, aim, or purpose of the legislature is at all capable of
apperception. Here and here alone does talk of the intent of the legislature become
meaningless and barbaric. And here society and the legislature both entrust them-
selves to the law-making powers of courts.
Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HAxV. L. Rnv. 886, 893 (1930).
11. For some examples where the Court reconciled various provisions of Norris-La
Guardia with subsequent labor legislation in the absence of congressional direction, see
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) and Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men v. Chicago R. & I. . . -(Chicago River), 353 U.S. 30 (1957). In Lincoln Mills the
Court sustained a district court order compelling employer performance of an agreement
to arbitrate, holding that this injunction (issued in a suit brought under § 301) need not
comply with the procedural requirements of § 7 of Norris-LaGuardia. Also see Judge
Magruder's opinion in Local 205, United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d
85, 93-94 (1st Cir. 1956), for a discussion of the reasoning underlying this accommoda-
tion. In Chicago River, a case brought under the Railway Labor Act, the Court allowed
injunction of a strike despite the prohibitions of § 4 of Norris-LaGuardia, reasoning that
the compulsory arbitration provisions of the RLA warranted the conclusion that § 4 had
1963]
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4. The Problem of Legislative Silence or Inaction
The obligation of courts to produce a rational body of law, while respecting
the differentiation of function between court and legislature, is implicit in the
general propositions developed above. This obligation usually persists even in
situations where the legislature has consciously failed to act. Such refusals
to act may take the form of rejection of a proposal that would bear on the
situation before the court, or of a proposal which would modify a previous
judicial interpretation of a statute. The reasons for legislative inaction are
numerous and may have nothing whatever to do with a preference for one
result or another in the particular case before a court.12
II.
In ruminating about the application to Sinclair of these ordinary principles
of statutory interpretation, it should be noted that difficulty arises only where
there are two or more plausible interpretations upon which the outcome of a
case may turn. In other words, it is to be expected in the difficult case that
the task of projection and imputation contemplated by the rule of statutory
purpose often will not lead to one indisputable or certain result. Neverthe-
less an examination of the central purposes of section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia
and section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act supports the con-
clusion of the dissenting Justices of the Supreme Court. Preclusion of injunc-
tive relief for a strike over an arbitrable grievance would work greater damage
to the core policies of section 301, especially in light of the gloss that statute
has acquired since 1958, than allowance of such relief would work on the
policies of Norris-LaGuardia.
The argument for allowing a district court to enjoin a strike over an issue
subject to arbitration under the terms of a collective bargaining contract might
best proceed along the following lines.
been superseded in the situation before the Court by the RLA. These cases were distin-
guished in Sinclair.
For an interesting example of reinterpretation of a statute in light of subsequent legis-
lation, see United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941) (Clayton, Act).
12. Thus, for example, legislative silence or inaction is as consistent with an intent
to leave the situation fluid as with a desire for any particular result.
For an instance where the Court refused to apply the presumption that re-enactment
of a statute that had acquired a judicial gloss indicates congressional acquiescence in the
previous interpretation, see Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946), which over-
turned three previous Supreme Court interpretations of the loyalty provisions of the
Naturalization Act.
It seems to me plain that Congress was very happy to leave the whole agitation
precisely where it lay, in the Court's lap, with the responsibility for doing anything
about it on the Court. The obvious, if not the only, way Congress could achieve
this was just what Congress did, do nothing, and, if the whole naturalization law
was to be revised in other respects, take care to repeat the same language in this
respect.
CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 242 (1947).
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1. The Policy Behind the Norris-LaGuardia Act
It is true that a literal reading of Norris-LaGuardia precludes an injunction
in the Sinclair case. However, Norris-LaGuardia is a statute that neither has
been,13 nor can be, read in a literal fashion.
This act, dating back to 1932, was the product of a reaction to a massive
and ill-advised judicial intervention into labor-management relations. During
the first thirty years or so of this century the federal courts played an ex-
tremely important role in the struggle between organized labor and manage-
ment.14 In this struggle labor employed its standard self-help techniques for
organizing and bargaining. These included strikes, picketing, and boycotts
(both primary and secondary). Management had its own self-help weapons:
the lock-out, the yellow dog contract, strike breakers, and Pinkerton agents, to
mention the most notorious. Management also had another weapon: injunc-
tive relief against concerted union pressure.
And the courts rendered it a potent weapon.' i Repeatedly they enjoined the
union from engaging in concerted action. It may be that the judges of this
time were anti-union and pro-management, but whether this helps explain
judicial behavior or not, it is clear that as institutions the courts in these cases
were acting far beyond their range of competency.10 In this labor-management
struggle, courts adjudicated without standards, without guidelines, and with-
out restraint.
At issue in almost every case were the competing interests of the employer
who wanted to manage as he chose; the employees who wished to bargain
13. E.g., Syres v. Oil Workers Inel Union, 233 F.2d 739 (5th Cir.), ree'd, 350 U.S.
892 (1955) ; Graham v. Brotherhood of Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949) and cases cited in
note 11 supra.
14. For a full discussion of the jurisdiction of the federal courts over labor disputes
during this period, see FRANxFURTER & GaE, THE LABOR INJuNcrio 1-46 (1930)
[hereinafter cited as FRANKFURTER & GREENE] and WrrrE, THE GovmEx.mNT in LAEOa
DiSPUTEs 12-45 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Wrrrm].
15. A sampling of cases might include Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v Gee, 139 F. 582
(S.D. Iowa, 1905); King v. Ohio & M. Ry., 14 Fed. Cas. 539 (No. 7,800) (C.C.D. Ind.
1877); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); Hitchman Coal & Coke v. Mitchell, 245 U.S.
229 (1917) ; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) ; Coronado Coal
Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journey-
men Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
In truth, the extraordinary remedy of injunction has been the ordinary legal rem-
edy, almost the sole remedy. Controversy over its exercise long has "overshadowed
in bitterness the question of the relative substantive rights of the parties." In the
administration of justice between employer and employee, it has become the central
lever ... The injunction is America's distinctive contribution in the application
of law to industrial strife.
FRANKFarFER & GREENE at 52.
16. See, e.g., Vegelaha v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896) ; compare At-
chison T. & S.F. Ry. v. Gee, 139 F. 582, 584 (S.D. Iowa 1905) ("There is and can be
no such thing as peaceful picketing"), with American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central
Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 207 (1921) ("The purpose [of judicial control] should be
to prevent the inevitable intimidation of the presence of groups of pickets, but to allow
19631 1553
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together in a union; the dissenting employees, who did not want to participate
in the union movement; other organized and unorganized segments of the
economy, many of which just wanted to be let alone. Ultimately at issue per-
haps was the economic and political growth of the nation. How were judges to
resolve these competing claims? What lines were they to draw? Plainly the
judges were at large. They drew lines on the basis of hunch and prejudice and
accordingly they brought chaos to the bargaining process and disrepute to the
judicial process.' 7
Unlike these substantive problems, however, there was no inherent reason
why the procedure the courts devised for injunction cases should have been
as bad as it was. And it was very bad. Injunctions were issued by trial courts
in ex parte proceedings.' 8 They were issued on the basis of affidavits. No real
opportunity was given to the union.10 Decrees were extremely broad and
sweeping in scope. 20 The punishment for violation of a decree was contempt;
the trial summary and without benefit of jury.21 And it was the trial court's
temporary or interlocutory injunction that usually disposed of a case, for at
missionaries."). See generally WrzE, 12-45 (1932) and SHULMAI, LADOR AND THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 769 at 777-78 (1940).
No rational principle of labor policy--e-xcept possibly the policy that labor unions
must "not be strong"--can harmonize the many decisions of the federal courts in
labor cases under the anti-trust laws.
Id. at 277.
17. Concern over the loss of respect for the federal judiciary provided an impetus for
the passage of Norris-LaGuardia. The Senate Report observed: "It is not difficult to
understand how such cruel laws, made not by any legislature but by a judge upon the
bench, should bring our Federal courts into disrepute." S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. 18 (1932). "This judge-made law has developed in, the past 40 years. The judges
have themselves made the law and have themselves enforced the penalties for the violation
of the laws made by them. . . . It is because of this development of law made on the
bench that our Federal courts have lost a great deal of respect." 75 CoNG. Rc. 5463
(1932) (remarks of Representative O'Connor).
Indeed some viewed the Act as one to govern the courts rather than labor-manage-
ment relations.
We are trying to reestablish a system of laws for the government of the courts.
We are writing a law binding the courts to a definite course of action with refer-
ence to injunctions. We are not disturbing the government of laws but we are tatk-
ing away from the courts their right to act as if they were a government of men.
75 CoNG. REc. 5481 (1932) (Representative Oliver).
The public policy laid down in the bill, I think, is essential, because there should
be some standard by which the courts may know, at a time when they are in such
confusion, what it is proper to do. I think the most fitting and, in reality, the only
proper tribunal to express such a policy is the Congress....
Id. at 5470 (Representative Browning).
18. Of the 118 labor injunction cases reported in the federal courts from 1901-1928,
70 ex parte orders were issued. FRANxFURTER & GREENE at 64.
19. See FRANKFURTER & GREENE 79-80, 200-02; WiTrr 121.
20. See scope of the decree in Re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) ; W -rr. 96.
21. E.g., United States v. Taliaferro, 290 Fed. 906 (4th Cir. 1923) (criminal con-
tempt); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911) (civil contempt).
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this stage in history most concerted union activity was unable to survive an
initial injunction.2
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was a clear cut political response to these sub-
stantive and procedural abuses. It is a statute that reflects a "government hands
off" philosophy of labor relations, and at the time of its enactment, government
meant judicial intrusion through injunctive decreeY2 This attitude to.ard labor-
management relations, however, has been drastically modified in the years
since Norris-LaGuardia.
Congress first legislated to prohibit certain employer anti-union self-help
activities.24 Subsequently, it placed prohibitions upon certain types of con-
certed union conduct.2 5 The principal responsibility for the administration
of this new federal labor policy was not given to the courts; rather it was
delegated to an administrative tribunal. Nevertheless, it has in the intervening
years become necessary for the Supreme Court to accommodate the Norris-
LaGuardia Act to the demands of this changing labor policy.
For example, under the Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Rela-
tions Act the majority union represents all employees in the bargaining unit.
This has been held to impose a duty of fair representation on the union. A
breach in the seemingly absolute language of Norris-LaGuardia has been
judicially imposed so as to allow a district court to rectify a violation of this
duty by enjoining a union from discriminating against minority employees in
the bargaining unit.
2 6
Indeed, in cases involving the Railway Labor Act, the Court has gone very
far to return the injunction to the district courts. Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Chicago River Railroad2 7 is the high water mark of this tide.
There the Court held that a district court may, indeed should, prohibit a peace-
ful strike in violation of a statutory duty to arbitrate.2 Subsequent decisions
22. Only 32 of the 88 temporary injunctions reported from 1901-1928 reached the
permanent injunction stage. FPAxKF URTE & GRaiw 79, 80.
23. See notes 17-21 .rtpra. For a history of the Act in Congress see Witte, Tie
Federal Anti-Injunction Act, 16 MINN. L. R-v. 638 (1932).
24. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
25. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-52, 178 (1958) and as amended by 73 Stat. 537, 541, 542, 544,
29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 159-60, 164, 186, 528-31 (Supp. IV, 1959).
26. Graham v. Brotherhood of Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949) (R.L.A.); Syres v.
Local 23, Oil Workers International Union, 233 F.2d 739 (5th Cir.), reovd, 350 U.S.
892 (1955) (N.L.R.A.). Cf. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
It should be noted that none of these cases involve activities specifically immunized by
§ 4 of Norris-LaGuardia. See Wellington, Judge Magruder and the Labor Contract, 72
Hxv. L. REgv. 1268, 1274-81 (1959).
27. 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
28. The court reasoned that Norris-LaGuardia and the RLA, forming a pattern of
legislation, had to be accommodated "so that the obvious purpose in the enactment of
each is preserved." Id. at 40. It found that the compulsory arbitration procedures estab-
lished in the RLA were not only an adequate substitute for the free use of economic
1963] 1555
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have clarified the area in which a strike injunction is an allowable and appro-
priate remedy for effectuating the policy of the RLA.20
Judicial accommodation of Norris-LaGuardia and the NLRA has not had
to be as extensive as it might have been, since Congress itself has explicitly
modified Norris-LaGuardia in a number of situations where the earlier statute
seemed to be deeply inconsistent with the purposes of the subsequent legisla-
tion. When a union engages in illegal secondary boycotts or illegal organiza-
tional picketing, the NLRB's General Counsel must request injunctive relief
from a district court. He may seek such relief whenever a union commits an
unfair labor practice.3 0 District courts can also enjoin national emergency
strikes if requested to do so by the Attorney General.81
To what extent then can it be said that the policy underlying the Norris-
LaGuardia Act is at variance with the injunction of a strike over an arbitrable
dispute that is in breach of a collective bargaining contract? Certainly there is
no reason for serious concern about the use of proper procedures in the district
courts. It may be that unless the Supreme Court were to be quite specific
about procedure, some district courts would act imprudently. But guidelines
exist in those cases where the labor injunction has been returned to the district
courts, in the federal rules of civil procedure, 82 and in the Norris-LaGuardia
Act itself.8 3 The Supreme Court can easily build upon these precedents.
The substantive questions in an injunction case are often more subtle, but
the task for the court is very different from what it was prior to the passage
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Courts will not be dealing with legislatively
undifferentiated union conduct, but rather with conduct made improper by
statute. The competing interests of employer, union, employees, and the pub-
lic have been weighed by Congress, which has found that it is wrong for a
union to strike in breach of contract over an arbitrable grievance. 4 The stand-
force contemplated, by Norris-LaGuardia but also constituted a sufficiently important fed-
eral policy which would be rendered "nugatory" if injunctive relief was not available.
Thus the non-interference policy of Norris-LaGuardia was held to be non-applicable. Id.
at 40-42.
29. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 373 U.S. 33 (1963).
Cf. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 611 n.10 (1959) ; but cf. Manion v. Iansas
City Terminal Ry., 353 U.S. 927 (1957).
30. L.M.R.A. § 10(j)g(1), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), as amended, 72 Stat. 945 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1958), 29 U.S.C.A. § 169(1) (Supp. 1959). Section 10(j) authorizes
the Board to seek in its discretion an injunction against alleged unfair labor practice
after issuance of a complaint by the General Counsel; 10(L) requires such relief to be
sought as a prerequisite to issuance of a complaint against violations of §§ 8(b) (4)
(A-C), - (b) (7), - (e).
31. 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-80 (1958).
Section 302, entailing employer payments to union representatives and the management
of pension and welfare funds, allows a private party to seek injunctive relief. 73 Stat.
537 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 186 (Supp. 1963).
32. FED. R.,Crv. P. 65(a) (b) (c).
33. Section 7, 49 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
34. The extent of statutory commitment to enforcement of collective bargaining agree-
ments and to the settlement of grievances without resort to self-help may be gleaned from
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ard exists; the difficulty lies in ascertaining whether particular conduct comes
within the standard. Sometimes this may prove a difficult task. It is not al-
ways clear why a union strikes or what disputes are subject to arbitration. 35
In damage cases, however, the courts have this very task, and it would seem
that they are as capable of making these judgments where the remedy is
equitable rather than legal.
2. The Policy Behind Section 301
While the purpose underlying the Norris-LaGuardia Act suggests that that
statute should not preclude a district court from enjoining a breach of contract
strike over an arbitrable grievance, the purpose embodied in section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act strongly suggests the desirability of the
strike injunction. This judgment about section 301's purpose is particularly
compelling given the gloss put upon the statute by the Supreme Court.
Lincoln Mills is the key decision.30 In that case the Court in 1958 held that
section 301 empowered a federal district court to order specific performance
of a promise to arbitrate unresolved grievances. Lincoln Mills went a long
way towards making arbitration the central institution in the administration
of collective bargaining contracts. Subsequent decisions have elaborated the
consequences of this recognition. Once the parties include an arbitration clause
in their collective bargaining contract they are bound, as a matter of federal
law, to submit the vast bulk of disputes that they are unable to resolve by
negotiation to an arbitrator.3 7 Neither the employer nor the union is free to
disregard this obligation.
It is plainly contrary to the obligation for a union to strike over an arbi-
trable grievance. An employer may recover damages if a union does so strike.
the following cases. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mfills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369
U.S. 95 (1962).
35. For example the scope of the arbitration promise cannot be resolved through
reference to principles of commercial contract law or rules of thumb. See Teamsters
Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). Query if the court would similarly imply
a no-strike pledge coextensive with the promise to arbitrate in Lucas if a strike injunc-
tion was the relief sought by the employer in that case. Also compare Teamsters Union
v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 282 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1960), rev'd, 370 U.S.
711 (1962), with A.-. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
The decision whether a particular dispute is arbitrable may in part depend on the
consequences of such a holding. Compare United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay.
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), with Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254
(1962).
For the problem of determining the impetus for a strike in a closely related context,
see Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
36. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
37. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). In this
case the Court found that all doubts as to whether a particular dispute is covered by an
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A damage remedy alone, however, may be a less effective way of implement-
ing the policy contained in Lincoln Mills and its progeny than the strike in-
junction. A suit for damages can drag on for a long time, well beyond the time
it takes for an arbitrator to enter his award, and for a court to enforce it.
Continuing litigation tends to undermine the salutory effect of the arbitration
process, for it keeps the parties in a posture of conflict rather than in a state
of repose. The injunction, on the other hand, is quick and clean and its radia-
tions tend to be coextensive with the arbitration process. Moreover it may be
true, as Mr. Justice Brennan suggests, that if "unions cannot be enjoined by a
federal court from striking in open defiance of their undertakings to arbitrate,
employers will pause long before committing themselves to obligations enforce-
able against them but not against their unions."
88
An injunction thus proves to be the one remedy that best effectuates the
purposes of section 301 as those purposes have been announced by the Su-
preme Court through a process of "litigating elucidation."
The legislative history of section 301, which shows that Congress refused
to repeal the Norris-LaGuardia Act in contract litigation generally, is a his-
tory written without benefit of a full understanding of the ramifications of
section 301. One should not draw as a negative inference from congressional
failure to act the conclusion that Congress did not want the Court to deal
rationally with section 301 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act where the two stat-
utes intersect. Such a conclusion attributes more to Congress than its inaction
properly can bear.39 Moreover, a statute's history should not be read in a way
that undercuts the very purpose of the statute itself. As Mr. Justice Brennan
insisted in dissent:
The legislative history of Section 301 ... shows that Congress considered
and rejected the advisability of repealing the Norris-LaGuardia Act in-
sofar as suits based upon breach of collective bargaining agreements are
arbitration provision are to be resolved in favor of coverage; the presumption of arbitra-
tion fails only where the parties "specifically exclude" the matter from the compass of
the duty to arbitrate.
For the limited review of the arbitrator's decision, including the jurisdictional ques-
tion, see United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
But cf. Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). See generally Well-
ington, Judicial Review of the Promise to Arbitrate, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 471 (1962).
38. 370 U.S. at 227.
39. An outright repeal of Norris-LaGuardia would have had far different conse-
quences than an attempt to reconcile the two statutes as they come to bear on, a particular
factual situation. See instant case at 225. Thus, all that deletion of the House proposal to
repeal Norris-LaGuardia can properly stand for is that Congress did not intend to relieve
the courts of the task of accommodating the two statutes in particular cases. Cf. NLRB
v. Drivers' Union, 362 U.S. 274, 282 (1960). And see MisHnax & Moxuus, ON LAw Iv
COURTS 309 (1961).
There was, to be sure, an isolated statement by Senator Taft indicating that section
301 only "conferred a right of action, for damages... ." 93 CoN(. REc. 6600 (1947). But
such an isolated remark hardly sheds light on the intent of Congress. Indeed the statement
was not viewed as controlling in Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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concerned .... But congressional rejection of outright repeal certainly
does not imply hostility to an attempt by the courts to accommodate all
statutes pertinent to the decision of cases before them. 0
III.
If the law of the collective bargaining contract were to be developed accord-
ing to the rule of statutory purpose, it seems fair to say that the Court should
have accommodated section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to section 301 of the
L.M.R.A. A proper accommodation--one that best serves the policy of section
301 without undermining the purposes of Norris-LaGuardia-seemingly would
allow a district court to enjoin a breach of contract strike over an arbitrable
grievance. Congress might itself have made the accommodation expressly and
specifically, but it did not. Indeed, it did not realize quite what it was producing
when it enacted section 301. It is, of course, not at all unusual for Congress, or
any other legislative body, to fail squarely to confront a problem. When this
happens, the rule of statutory purpose requires courts, "[f] linch as [they] may
. . . to project [themselves] . . . into the position of those who uttered the
words, and to impute to them how they would have dealt with the concrete
occasion."
Adherence to this canon of interpretation does not permit free, non-institu-
tional consideration of the import or validity of the result arrived at through
the process of projection and imputation. Indeed that process consists of attun-
ing the mind to a vision comparable to that possessed by the legislature. But are
there not special situations where the Supreme Court, for special institutional
reasons, should decline in the absence of a clear congressional statement to reach
the result indicated by adherence to the rule of statutory purpose? It seems to
us that there are several situations with closely related considerations where
this may be the case, and that Sinclair falls within one of these.
Before examining these situations, however, it should be observed that there
are dangers in this suggested canon of statutory interpretation-the clear state-
ment rule-which, in requiring Congress emphatically to decide certain issues,
asks the Court to reject or ignore at least a portion of congressional intent as
that intent is derived from legislative purpose.4 ' However, the clear statement
rule asks the Court to do so because of considerations that are founded upon in-
stitutional values which are not accounted for in the ordinary process of pro-
jection and imputation. And the dangers are minimized by the competency of
the Court to assay these considerations and the extent to which they are pres-
ent in any particular situation. Accordingly, although these considerations dis-
tort statutory purpose, they at the same time provide sufficient guidelines to
the Court for determining whether departure from statutory purpose is war-
ranted and, if so, the direction and extent of that departure.
40. 370 U.S. at 220.
41. This is not very unlike the danger in the rule of projection and imputation; some
judges may, whether deliberately or not, find in either rule an invitation to enforce their
own policies or hunches. But the hazards seem inherent in the undertaking.
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Moreover, reliance on the clear statement rule is not particularly novel, al-
though it is rarely articulated as a discrete canon of interpretation which
requires a departure from the results dictated by statutory purpose. The most
familiar situation in which this canon is operative is where the Court is con-
fronted with a federal statute that would raise serious constitutional questions
if interpreted in the manner most consistent with its underlying purpose.
4 2
Where this is the case, it seems generally appropriate for the Court to construe
the statute in a way that does not pose the constitutional issue, unless it is
inescapably clear that Congress itself directly confronted the situation before
the Court and spoke unequivocally. The elected branches of government should
have a responsibility to the people to determine explicitly and for the record
that constitutionally questionable action is, in their opinion, necessary action.
Whether or not Congress has made such a determination of necessity should
not be left to judicial surmise from the bits and pieces of legislative materials
and other evidences which ordinarily suffice for the inference of statutory pur-
pose. In such a situation the Court should neither exercise its ultimate power
and declare legislation unconstitutional nor legitimate constitutionally question-
42. E.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). See Well-
ington, Machinists v. Street: Statutory Interpretation and the Avoidance of Constitution-
al Issues, 1961 Sup. CoURT REv. 49. The doctrine has often been invoked where the con-
stitutional issue raised appears to be an intractable one or where it borders on the area
of political questions in which acceptable standards for a constitutional adjudication are
not available. An apt illustration is United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953), in
which the Court, "in the candid service of avoiding a serious constitutional doubt," id. at
47, narrowly construed a congressional resolution authorizing an investigation of lobby-
ing activities despite legislative history to the contrary, and held that the questions put
to Rumely were beyond the authority of the committee. The Court added: "Whenever
constitutional limits upon the investigative power of Congress have to be drawn by this
Court, it ought only to be done after Congress has demonstrated its full awareness of
what is at stake by unequivocally authorizing an inquiry of dubious limits." Id. at 46.
Compare Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) ; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958) (where the Court held that denial of a passport by the Secretary of State for
security reasons was beyond his authority, despite considerable evidence that Congress
had decided the issue, albeit back-handedly and off-handedly and less explicitly than might
be desirable with an issue of such importance) ; Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
For a fuller discussion, of these cases, see BicKEL, Tn. LziAST DANGEROUs BitANCn
156-69 (1962).
Considerations similar to those underlying the clear statement rule may be seen in
many of the void for vagueness cases, both state and federal, in which the Court employs
a vagueness rationale to avoid a larger more momentous constitutional issue lurking in
the background. E.g., International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216
(1914). Id. at 589. Note Mr. Justice Holmes' sympathy with the confiscation and equal
economic protection claims. Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210
(1932) (strong expropriation argument). Compare the first amendment vagueness cases,
which are precisely what the name implies. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) ;
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) ; Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of
Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 694-95 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For a thorough
discussion of the many uses of the void for vagueness doctrine, see Amsterdam, The
Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rxv. 67 (1960).
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able action that has not been squarely confronted by Congress or the President
by declaring the challengeable construction constitutional. Plainly the Court is
well able to determine whether a proffered construction would present a sub-
stantial constitutional question and therefore is well able to identify the situa-
tions where this consideration is sufficiently present to justify a departure from
the rule of statutory purpose. The Sinclair case dearly does not fall within this
category of cases; there is no issue of constitutional dimensions lurking in the
background of that case.
The second category in which this canon may be invoked is where the Court
is asked to make law without sufficient standards or guides for decision. Here
departure from the rule of statutory purpose owing to the pull of institutional
considerations has been less explicit, and consequently such departure is less
familiar.43 For sundry reasons Congress may delegate to the courts lawmaking
powers over large unchartered areas. The only thing that can realistically be
called the legislative purpose underlying such delegations is that the courts are
to fashion law in accordance with their own notions of sound policy. Where the
delegation is unstructured and the areas are also unfamiliar to the courts, it is
likely that their performance will leave much to be desired. 44 Thus such delega-
tions, while perhaps not inconsistent with the judicial functions broadly defined
in Article III, may require courts to undertake tasks beyond the scope of judi-
cial expertness and thereby impede the courts' performance of other more judi-
cially suitable functions. This aspect of institutional capacity is not one that Con-
gress, with its vision fixed on immediate results, is likely to have considered.
But it is a consideration which the Court is quite competent to assess. Be-
cause a construction in accordance with this consideration represents an at-
tempt to ensure a proper allocation of functions within our institutions of
government and because such a construction in no way checks legislative
power, but rather asks Congress to reexamine its objectives in light of an
additional consideration, departure from the rule of statutory purpose seens
justified in these circumstances. To be sure, the immediate objectives of Con-
43. However, a perusal of the dissent of Justice Brandeis in Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 488 (1921) shows that articulation of these considerations
as the basis for favoring one interpretation of a statute over another is not completely
absent in the opinions of the Court. Cf. International News Service v. Associated Press,
248 U.S. 215, 262-67 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Also comzpare Apex Hosiery Co.
v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), with United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
44. Section 707(a) (3) of the Naturalization Act, which requires that the applicant
for citizenship be of "good moral character" for the five years preceding naturalization
provides an example of such a delegation. And for an example of the unsuitability of
the courts to administer such a standard, see Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152
(2d Cir. 1947). Consider as another example of an unwise delegation the national ener-
gency provisions of the N.L.R.A. which authorizes a court to enjoin a strike or lock-out
upon finding that such a strike or lock-out "will imperil the national health or safety."
The finding was perhaps made, but not without considerable difficulty, in United Steel-
workers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959). Cf. Pound, Connon Law and Legislation,
21 HAxv. L. REv. 383, 403-04 (1908).
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gress may be temporarily frustrated. But the protection to the integrity of
judicial institutions which dictates such a result will often be of far more en-
during significance.45
It has been argued that the whole of section 301 falls within this category.40
That section delegated to the judiciary the job of fashioning a code of labor
contract that it was to spin out of an industrial environment with which it had
no experience. The task imposed upon the courts was not very unlike that
which the courts took upon themselves in the first part of this century when
they attempted to develop a general body of labor law without adequate stand-
ards for decision. Sinclair itself, however, does not fall within this category.
Lincoln Mills and the cases following it poured content into section 301. That
content may prove wise or unwise, but, as indicated above, it does provide
standards and guides for decision in situations of the Sinclair variety.
Thd third category, while closely related to the considerations upon which
the other two are founded, is more difficult to define and raises problems that
are not posed by the others. Broadly stated, it consists of a delegation from
Congress to the courts of an issue that is politically highly sensitive or
charged; an issue that Congress is institutionally able to resolve, save for a
legislative paralysis that is sometimes attributable to the pressures of conflict-
ing interest groups; and an issue that Congress has failed to resolve, at least
explicitly. On the one hand, the issue may have been so politically charged
that Congress purposefully passed it off to the Court.47 The rule of statutory
purpose would here lead to a decision based upon what the Court thought was
the best substantive policy. For the student of labor history, the Clayton Act 48
and the Duplex dase will come quickly to mind as an example. (And the
Duplex decision and its aftermath illustrates the unwisdom of following, in
such a situation, the rule of statutory purpose.) 49 On the other hand, the
issue may be one, and Sinclair seems to represent such a case, where Congress
45. For a more exhaustive treatment of this category, see Bickel & Wellington, Leg-
islative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HAv. L. REv. 1
(1957).
46. Ibid.
47. See ILBERT, THE MECHANICS OF LAW MAKING 19-23 (1914). Cf. CuRTIS, LIONS
UNDER THE THRONE 242-43 (1947).
48. The Act was well characterized in BicKE, THE UNrULsHED OrINIONS OF Mt.
JUsTIcE BRANDEIS:
The Claytor Act appears to have been. the product of mixed Congressional motives,
which it reflected in its many ambiguities. It was studded, at decisive places, with
words such as "lawful" and "legitimate" and it gave them no explicit new content.
Other crucial terms were also lacking in precision, though Section 16, which was
to prove a boon to employers, provided with all due clarity that private parties
could-as they had not been previously authorized to do-seek injunctive relief
under the Sherman Act.
Id. at 80-81 (1957).
49. Compare United Mine Workers v. Coranodo Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922), with
Coranodo Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925). Compare Bedford Cut
Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927). See note 15 supra.
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was not fully cognizant of some of the sensitive problems that would emerge
in the application of its enactment.
This third category resists precise definition. Because of the lack of a precise
definition, and because the Court does not seem as peculiarly competent to as-
sess politically sensitive issues as it is to appreciate constructions which raise
constitutional doubts or delegations of tasks that courts are ill-suited to perform,
reliance on the clear statement rule in this third category of cases should be
undertaken with caution and restraint. Nevertheless there are clear instances
where departure from legislative purpose in this category would seem to be
warranted. The principal consideration here rests on the proposition that reso-
lution of contested issues touching upon sensitive areas of our social and eco-
nomic life should be made by the electorally based and therefore responsive
political institutions. Although it is by no means wholly fictive to impute the
result arrived at through the process of inference from statutory purpose to
Congress, nevertheless application of this canon to some issues fails to assure
with sufficient certainty that a considered, responsible decision has been made
by the political institutions. It is surely not fictive to say that where something
is done explicitly and the decision is reflected on the face of a statute, Congress
and the President were more likely to have understood what was being author-
ized than where the legislative resolution must be gleaned from cloudy legis-
lative history and other perhaps ambiguous evidences of statutory purpose.
This consideration is not unlike the one advanced above to justify the avoid-
ance of a constitutional issue in spite of the construction indicated by the rule
of statutory purpose. This canon as applied to issues that have far-reaching
implications, such as where a particular construction would work a substantial
reallocation of power in our federal system,50 or issues that the political con-
figurations of the times or legislative history demonstrates are hotly contested
and significant to large numbers of people in our society, or issues involving
sensitive areas of liberty, has the salutary effect of stiffening the lines of legis-
lative responsibility and of making those lines perceptible to the people.
Many cases that fall within this third category will merge with those of in-
stitutional incapacity, since many of the issues adumbrated above will often
prove to be peculiarly unsusceptible to judicial resolution. Whether they do or
not is not especially significant, however, since the overriding consideration
that certain decisions should be clearly made by the representative branches of
government is not affected by the joinder or its absence.
50. An instance closely aliA to this one, where the invocation of the clear statement
rule would seem appropriate, is where one interpretation of a statute would work vast
and far-reaching changes in an established body of jurisprudence, either statutory or com-
mon law. Such changes in a body of existing doctrine is not a factor Congress is likely
to have considered in passing a statute, and the disruption worked by such a statute is a
consideration worthy of legislative attention. This suggestion should not be confused with
the doctrine that statutes are excrescences on the common law and are not to be construed
in derogation of it. See Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Hnv. L. Rzv. 383,
396-403 (1908). However, one may surmise that the above consideration sometimes under-
laid application of this doctrine.
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Consider as an example of this category some of the applications of the
rule of statutory interpretation requiring that penal statutes be strictly con-
strued. Sometimes the application of this rule can be justified in terms of fair
warning to the accused.5 ' Sometimes its application has no justification. Can
its use ever be justified where it conflicts with the rule of statutory purpose?
It seems that the answer is yes where the question of statutory interpretation
is whether to bring within the ambit of the statute previously acceptable con-
duct which statutory purpose indicates is probably covered.5 2 Or consider as
another example some of the applications of the presumption against imputing
to Congress the casual intention of changing existing law where the effect of
such a change would be to work a significant alteration in the distribution of
power between the state and federal governments. Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
while writing in terms of legislative purpose, suggests such a presumption in
his important article on the reading of statutes:
In the interpretation of recent regulatory statutes . . . the judicial task
. . . is one of accommodation as between assertions of new federal au-
thority and historic functions of the individual states. Federal legislation
of this character cannot therefore be construed without regard to the im-
plications of our dual system of government.... The underlying assump-
tions of our dual form of government, and the consequent presuppositions
of legislative draftsmanship which are expressive of our habits and his-
tory, cut across what might otherwise be the implied range of legislation."
As a society becomes increasingly complex, increasingly must formerly
acceptable conduct be designated criminal and increasingly must power be
centralized in the federal government. Either of these tasks often may be
51. Although the fair warning function requiring definiteness in criminal cases has
often been debunked, there are cases in. which it appears to be the decisive factor. E.g.,
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). However, there are numerous cases in which
a statute is found to lack sufficient definiteness where fair warning is not adequate to
explain the result. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875). See Amsterdam, The
Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 82-85 (1960)
and cases cited therein..
52. The void for vagueness doctrine, now invoked as a constitutional proscription,
has its roots in a canon of statutory interpretation. Where a criminal statute was sus-
ceptible of more than, one meaning, the courts would simply refuse to enforce the stat-
ute, despite the fact that legislative purpose indicated the desired meaning. E.g,, United
States v. Sharp, 27 Fed. Cas. 1041, 1043 (No. 16264) (C.C.D. Pa. 1815) ; Drake v. Drake,
15 N.C. 110, 115 (1833) ("if the terms be . . . so vague as to convey no definite mean-
ing to those whose duty it is to execute it, either ministerially or judicially, it is neces-
sarily inoperative.").
More recent examples may be found of the Supreme Court's refusing to apply a fed-
eral statute whose terms it deemed too uncertain to apply without seeking in the Consti-
tution authority for its refusal. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 139 U.S. 278 (1891);
United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948).
See generally Aigler, Legislation in Vague or General Terms, 21 MIcix. L. Ruv 831
(1923).
53. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLut. L. Rv
527, 539-40 (1947).
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politically sensitive ones. The first involves a curtailment of freedom," the
second a gradual undermining of the viability of the states as political insti-
tutions. 55 Both tasks ultimately must be responsive to felt public need and
responsible to public judgment. Should not the courts usually refuse leader-
ship in these areas? Indeed, as a general proposition, should they not serve
as a check on the representative branches, one which says: You may ask us
to serve you in this regard, but we will refuse unless it is clear that it is on
your initiative that we do so?
The Sinclair case belongs in this same category for different, but neverthe-
less, analogous reasons. Labor-management relations is an area that is polit-
ically charged. Its dynamics are economic struggle which, in this country, is
translated from time to time into political struggle fought out in the Congress.
One of the touchiest issues in labor-management relations, which has been
once clearly resolved politically, is the strike injunction. It is an emotional
and symbolic issue, out of proportion today to its importance. That it should
be such an issue-particularly for the leaders of the union movement, most of
whom remember vividly the pre-Norris-LaGuardia days-is understandable
in view of the history of the American labor movement, and the role played
by the strike injunction in that history.
And section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia well attests to the role played by the
courts and the injunction in that history. While the policy of that statute may
no longer be wholly relevant to contemporary regulation of labor relations, that
statute nonetheless represents a clear cut political response to the use of injunc-
tions against peaceful strike activity. Indeed that section and the definition of
a labor dispute were drafted in broad terms in order to avoid the possibility
of narrowing through judicial construction. Moreover, although congressional
refusal to repeal Norris-LaGuardia should not be equated with a legislative
resolution of the issue, it does indicate that the anti-injunction provisions of
Norris-LaGuardia remain politically viable. Should the Supreme Court under-
take, as the rule of statutory purpose would have it undertake, the task of
54. For a particularly dramatic instance where the dear statement rule was operative,
see United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957).
This analysis would seem to explain why legislatiorr creating "new" crimes, which does
not tend generically to be unclear but is likely to represent intrusion into realms which
were previously free, is particularly vulnerable to vagueness attacks. E.g., Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) ; Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) ; see
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 634-35 (1954) (Jackson, J., dissenting). The
Court has noted the antiquity of statutes or their similarity to other more venerable crim-
inal statutes as a reason for sustaining them. E.g., United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513,
524 (1942) ; see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
55. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), where Chief Justice
Hughes, in dissent, persuasively demonstrated how the ordinary process of projection and
imputation demanded an extension of federal authority to the activity in question. Id. at
514. The Court found, however, that "maintenance in our federal system of a proper dis-
tribution between state and national governments of police authority and of remedies
private and public for public wrongs is of far-reaching importance. An intention to dis-
turb the balance is not lightly to be imputed to Congress." rd. at 513.
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re-introducing the strike injunction as a weapon available to the employer?
Might it not be persuasively argued, because of the symbolic importance of
the strike injunction in the politically sensitive area of labor-management re-
lations, and because the strike injunction has been once explicitly rejected by
the political process, that any change in its status should be made explicitly by
Congress and the President; that, if there is to be change, Congress itself must
confront the touchy question squarely and speak unequivocally?
Issue can be taken with this position. The effect on the arbitral process, the
newly discovered kingpin of federal labor policy, has to be considered. More-
over, it may be argued that characterizing this construction as a dialogue ini-
tiated by the Court with the political institutions is an oversimplification in
light of the infrequent occasions on which Congress deals with major labor
legislation. But neither of these arguments addresses itself to the range of con-
siderations on which this application of the clear statement rule of statutory
interpretation is bottomed. These considerations-that major decisions of policy
once made by the political process should be unmade only by a high visibility
decision of the institutions that have to account to the people periodically-
does not turn on such factors as the intrinsic wisdom or unwisdom of the de-
cisions that are made or not made. Thus the above arguments do not lessen,
what is to our mind, the obligation of the Court to keep clear the channels
of policy making and the lines of responsibility in a democratic society. This
obligation can be fulfilled only if the judicial institutions confine their functions
so as not to blur the distinction between interstitial lawmaking and dealing
with the gristle of the body politic. Certain issues should be faced squarely by
legislatures, and rules of statutory interpretation are, among other things, in-
struments for inducing such confrontation and instruments for the protection
of the people from the courts and the courts from the people.
56. There is language of Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Sinclair In-
dicating that these considerations were by no means wholly unrelated to the result in that
case. "[Section] 301 was not intended to have any such partially repealing effect 11pon
such a long-standing, carefully thought out and highly significant part of this counte.s
labor legislation as the Norris-LaGuardia Act." 370 U.S. at 203. (Emphasis added.)
However, the decision purports to rest on- plain language and legislative purpose inferrcd
from the history of section 301.
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